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This paper studies how loan credit risk depends on competition in the banking sector. We estimate 
an empirical model of credit risk using data from the Spanish Credit Register on individual loans 
to non-financial firms in 1992–2007. Our results show that credit risk decreases with the level of 
competition in the credit market, and they are consistent with the prediction from the moral hazard 
view on the determinants of credit risk. We also find that the probability of loan default varies 
with characteristics of the bank, the local market and macro variables.  
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Whether or not more competition in banking markets increases the risk exposure of banks 
and, through contagion, contributes to the fragility of the whole banking system is a 
relevant but unsettled research and policy question (Vives, 2016). There are two main 
competing views, i.e., the charter value and moral hazard, on the relation between banking 
competition, risk exposure of individual banks and financial stability. The charter value 
predicts that more intense competition in the deposits market has a negative effect on 
financial stability (Keeley, 1990; Hellmann et al., 2000), while the moral hazard view 
predicts that market competition contributes to lower credit risk and more financial 
stability (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Caminal and Matutes, 2002; Boyd and De Nicoló, 
2005). The different theoretical predictions have motivated empirical research to test 
which one holds in data (Kick and Prieto, 2014; Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2015). However, 
the different scope of analysis and the different databases complicate the comparison of 
the results.  
This paper presents new empirical evidence on the relationship between bank risk-
taking behavior and bank competition, with two important novelties: the use of loan level 
data and the analysis of the competition effect at local-market level. First, the use of loan 
level data has clear advantages over bank or country level data, because granting a loan 
is, per se, a risk-taking decision. Second, the structural measure of market competition in 
our paper is the density of bank branches in spatially delimited markets, where 
transportation costs generate spatial differentiation that decreases with the density of 
branches. In doing so, we acknowledge that the relevant markets for retail banking 
services are local markets served by bank branches.   
 
2. The empirical model and hypotheses 
The econometric model to be estimated is formulated as follows:  
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡()*+ = 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡*+1 𝛽3 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣*+1 𝛽8 + 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘)+1 𝛽< + 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜1+𝛽? +  
+𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛′(+𝛽B + 𝛾* + 𝜆) + 𝜀()*+ 
[1] 
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡()*+ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the loan granted to firm i by bank j in 
province p defaults in year t, and zero otherwise. The vector 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡*+1  includes variables 
that capture the intensity of competition from spatial differentiation in the local market; 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣*+1  includes characteristics of the borrowers in the province p that capture their credit 
quality. 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘)+1  is a vector of variables that refer to the bank j that grants the loan, and 
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜+  includes variables of the general economic conditions that are common to all 
loans at time t. Loan is a vector of dummy variables that controls for the characteristics 
of the loan (type, maturity, collateral). The gp and lj are province and bank fixed effects, 
respectively, and eijpt is the random disturbance term. Table 1 show the definition of the 
main variables used in the analysis. 
From the assumption of spatial positive transportation costs, higher density of 
branches in the province implies less spatial differentiation and more competition. Then, 
we can test the two competing hypotheses: Under the moral hazard (charter value) view, 
the probability of loan default decreases (increases) with the density of branches in the 
province. Since with free opening and closing of branches the density of branches is a 
function of the size of the market demand, the competing hypotheses are also tested with 
market demand variables, such as population and per-capita income.  
To compare the results with those in the previous literature and highlight the 
relevance of the market definition and the use of loan level data, we add the concentration 
of banks in the market (HHI calculated with the number of branches in a province) as 
explanatory variable of the probability of loan default. Now, more concentration implies 
less competition, so the expected sign of the coefficient of HHI is the opposite of the sign 
of the density of branches.  
The vector Macrot includes the interbank interest rate as a relevant variable for 
testing the competing hypotheses. Higher market interest rate increases the loan interest 
rate for a given level of competition, and the moral hazard view predicts that this would 
increase the probability of loan default (monetary transmission). The charter value view 
has no direct prediction on the effect of the market interest rate, but there is an indirect 
effect through the deposit market. Since higher interbank interest rates increase the profits 
in the deposit market, the value of the charter value of the bank increases. As a result, the 
bank becomes more conservative and the risk-appetite of banks decreases, reducing the 
probability of loan default.  
 
3. Database 
The data on bank loans to business firms comes from the Spanish Credit Register (CIR). 
This unique database contains information on all bank loans granted to nonfinancial firms 
in Spain above the threshold of 6,000 euros. For each bank loan, we know the bank that 
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granted it; the province where the borrower resides; and some loan characteristics such 
as the type of loan, the maturity, the guarantees, and if the loan is in default or not. We 
restrict our sample to loans lower than 1 million euros to focus on firms borrowing from 
branches in local markets, that is, 95% of the population of business loans in the CIR 
database. Larger loans are granted to large firms whose relevant market is likely to be the 
credit office of the parent bank, rather than a local market around a particular branch.  
The relevant market for the retail activities of a bank is the province where it 
grants the loan. The data on province level variables comes mainly from the Spanish 
Institute of Statistics (INE). The number of branches and bank level variables come form 
the accounting statements that each bank reports regularly to the Banco de España. 
Descriptive statistics of the values of the variables of the empirical model are presented 
in columns three and on in Table 1. 
 
4. Empirical results 
The results of the estimation of different specifications of model (1) appear in Table 2. 
All the models are estimated with standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and 
clustered at bank-province level. 
Column I present the results of the estimation with the number of bank branches, 
lnNBRANCH, as the only market competition variable. The estimated coefficient is 
negative and statistically significant, consistent with the moral hazard view. The positive 
and significant coefficient of INTERBANK is also consistent with the prediction from the 
moral hazard view that higher interest rates induce higher credit risk.  
The probability of loan default is also lower in provinces with higher GDP growth 
rate and lower UNEMPLOYMENT, that is, lower credit risk in more prosperous 
provinces. Loans granted by less productive banks (lower PROD) and with looser credit 
policies (high credit grow LOANGR and NPL) are riskier than otherwise. Finally, the 
capitalization of banks has a negative effect in the probability of loan default (negative 
coefficient of CAPITAL) indicating no evidence of substitution between financial and 
credit risk.  
Column II includes market concentration HHI and its square, HHISQ, as 
explanatory variables, and time dummies replace macro variables to strengthen the 
control for time varying effects. The estimated coefficients of HHI and HHISQ are not 
statistically significant, and the coefficient of lnNBRANCH increases its magnitude and 
statistical significance, compared to Column I. Thus, the market concentration variable 
strengthens, not diminishes, the competition effect of the density of branches. Controlling 
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for the distribution of the number of branches across banks, an increase in the density of 
branches implies more branches per bank. Thus, the results indicate that the competition 
effect in credit risk from increasing the density of bank branches is higher when the 
increase is evenly distributed among banks. The results also consistent with an increase 
in both the number of banks and the number of branches. In fact, the correlation of the 
number of branches and the number of banks in the province is relatively high in the data 
(88%). 
Column III of Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the model when the 
density of bank branches is replaced by the proxy variables of market size, GDPCAP and 
POPULATION (both in logs). The estimated coefficients of the two variables are negative 
as expected if the size of the market is a proxy of intensity of competition because they 
will attract the entry of larger number of branches.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Credit risk is at the core of the risk exposure of individual banks and, through contagion, 
also at the core of financial stability. The way in which competition in loan and deposit 
markets affects the risks taken in the lending decisions of banks is particularly important. 
If franchise value theory holds and more market competition induces riskier behavior by 
banks, then pro-competition policies and prudential banking regulation might come into 
conflict. In contrast, if the moral hazard view holds, market competition is aligned with 
safer bank loans.  
The empirical results with data on individual loans granted to business firms by 
Spanish banks broadly support the moral hazard view that more competition decreases 
credit risk. More concretely, we find a negative effect of the number of branches on the 
probability of default, which might also be explained by the higher number of banks 
operating in provinces with a higher number of branches (correlation of 88%). Bank 
market concentration does not directly affect credit risk, though the negative effect of the 
density of branches on credit risk is higher if branches are more evenly distributed among 
banks. The positive effect of the interbank interest rate in the probability of default also 
supports the moral hazard hypothesis.  
The empirical results also show that banks with a higher equity ratio grant loans 
with a lower probability of default. There is no evidence of a trade-off between lower 
financial risk and higher credit risk. Rather, the empirical evidence is consistent with the 
prediction from the charter value that the option value of deposit insurance decreases with 
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the capital ratio and for this reason more capitalized banks have lower incentives to take 
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MEAN SD P10th P50th P90th
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEFAULT  =1 if the loan is defaulted 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Competition Variables
lnNBRANCH Log of the number of branches in the
province 6.09 0.93 5.18 6.10 6.95
lnPOPU Log of the total population 16.17 0.86 15.21 16.17 17.16
GDPCAP p  (th€) Gross Domestic Product per capita,
constant Euros of 2000 17.96 6.69 9.94 17.11 27.18
Province Variables
GDPG p (%) GDP growth at constant euros of the
province 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.06
UNEMP p  (%) Unemployment rate of the province 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11
NPL p Ratio of non-performing loans in the
province 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.13
RURAL  (%) Percentage of population in villages
smaller than 2000 inhab 14.95 14.34 0.67 11.13 37.01
Bank Variables
PROD Productivity of the bank from
Levinsohn and Petrin methodology as
in Martín-Oliver et al. (2013) 7.58 0.45 7.03 7.58 8.19
lnASSETS Log of the total assets of the bank 15.55 1.54 13.60 15.55 17.69
LOANGR Yearly growth rate of the volume of
loans of the bank 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.31
NPL j Ratio of Non-performing loans 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.13
CAPITAL Sum of equity and reserves over total
assets of the bank 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09
Time-varying variables
INTERBANK Euribor 12 months, nominal terms 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.11
GDPG Spanish GDP growth at constant
euros 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05
INFLATION Growth rate of Consumption Price
Index 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05
Concentration
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index for the
branch network in a province 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.21
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Table 2. Determinants of Credit Risk in Bank Loans to Business Firms 
 
The *, **, and  *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. The t-ratios are in parentheses. 
Note: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the loan defaults and zero otherwise. The models 
are estimated with linear probability models that control for fixed effects, and the standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and are clustered at the bank-province level. Definitions for the variables are in Table 1 
 
Competition Variables
lnNBRANCH t-1 -0.017 ** -0.026 ***
(0.008) (0.010)
lnPOPU t-1 -0.025 *
(0.014)
ln GDPCAP p,t-1 -0.036 **
(0.014)
Province Variables
GDPG p,t-1 -0.043 *** -0.037 ** -0.023
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
UNEMP p,t-1 0.096 ** 0.144 ** 0.119 *
(0.047) (0.067) (0.070)
NPL p,t-1 0.030 0.030 0.024
(0.031) (0.035) (0.034)
RURAL p,t-1 0.013 0.016 0.061 *
(0.025) (0.025) (0.034)
Bank Variables
PROD t-1 -0.010 ** -0.010 *** -0.009 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
lnASSETS t-1 0.003 0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
LOANGR t-2 0.009 *** 0.005 * 0.005 *
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LOANGR t-3 0.016 *** 0.015 *** 0.016 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NPL j,t-1 0.424 *** 0.425 *** 0.429 ***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.049)
CAPITAL t-1 -0.115 ** -0.112 -0.138 ***
(0.051) (0.051) ** (0.048)
Time-varying variables













N.Observations 3,681,057 3,681,057 3,681,057
Dep =1 if Loan is Default II II III
NO YES YES








Province, Bank,  
Type Loan, 
Type Collateral, 
Maturity
